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Abstract: Internet of Things refers to all the smart objects that are connected to other objects, devices or1
servers and that are able to collect and share data, in order to “learn” and improve their functionalities.2
Smart objects suffer from lack of memory and computational power, since they are usually lightweight.3
Moreover, their security is weakened by the fact that smart objects can be placed in unprotected4
environments, where adversaries are able to play with the symmetric-key algorithm used and the5
device on which the cryptographic operations are executed. In this paper, we focus on a family of6
white-box symmetric ciphers SPNbox, extending and improving our previous paper on the topic7
presented at WIDECOM2019. We highlight the importance of white-box cryptography in the IoT8
context, but also the need to have a fast black-box implementation (server-side) of the cipher. We9
show that, modifying an internal layer of SPNbox, we are able to increase the key length and to10
improve the performance of the implementation. We measure these improvements (a) on 32/64-bit11
architectures and (b) in the IoT context by encrypting/decrypting 10,000 payloads of lightweight12
messaging protocol MQTT.13
Keywords: symmetric cryptography; IoT; MQTT; white-box approach; the SPNbox family14
1. Introduction15
The name Internet of Things (IoT), coined by the MIT researcher Kevin Ashton [1], usually refers16
to smart objects, connected through the Internet to other sensors, devices and servers with which17
collect and/or share data for improving their functionalities. IoT can also be combined with other18
technologies, for example with cloud computing [2]. It is possible to create a sustainable smart home19
aiming to reduce resources’ consumption or develop specific applications in the medical field [3] such20
as wearable devices which monitor our physical conditions, specific devices used to check patients21
with chronic illnesses, and so on. Data collected by IoT devices need to be (a) processed to form22
informations by applying, for example, data mining techniques [4]; (b) evaluated in order to make23
decision by adopting agent based models [5,6], bayesian decision models [7], fuzzy logic [8] and so on;24
(c) protected from attacks, failures and leaks during communication [2].25
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Several issues have to be faced in securing IoT applications. An important example is given by26
the intrinsic constraints of the devices [9], that usually have a small amount of memory and cannot27
perform heavy computations. It is very likely to have such devices in non-protected environment,28
where an adversary can access them and perform attacks. In particular, she/he can perform an analysis29
of the controlled binary [10] or perform differential fault analysis [11,12]. Moreover, since these devices30
are connected, compromising one of them can open the way to botnet attacks [2,3]. We can observe that31
we are exactly in a white-box framework, and white-box cryptography [13] has been first developed to32
cope with the scenario in which an attacker can physically interact both with the implementation of the33
used cryptographic algorithm and with the device on which the encryption/decryption operations are34
executed. The usually studied scenario, namely black-box, in which the execution cannot be observed35
nor modified by the attacker, is not always suitable for IoT applications [14]. The reader can think36
about what happens in the context of digital rights management where discovering the key means to37
have the possibility to spread digital contents to people that have not payed such contents.38
The effort of researchers towards white-box cryptographic schemes materialized with [15] and39
[13] where white-box versions of AES and DES have been implemented. Nevertheless, it is important40
to remark that these implementations have been attacked via algebraic attacks [16] (improved by [17])41
,[18],[19], [20]. Moreover, also [21] can easily break Chow’s implementations.42
The need to have white-box algorithms for practical applications leads to develop some specific43
algorithms. Examples of block ciphers developed to be employed in the framework of white-box44
cryptography are ASASA [22] and SPACE [23]. However, these ciphers are not free of drawbacks or45
weaknesses. In particular, decomposition attacks can affect ASASA’s security while SPACE is heavy46
from a computational point of view [24]. An important step forward for white-box cryptography, was47
the development of SPNbox [24], another block cipher that relies on internal block ciphers with the aim48
to reduce the computation time. In [9], the problem of intrinsic constraints on computational power49
and memory of IoT devices in unprotected environment is addressed. The authors refer to smart50
objects with limited computational power and memory that may contain sensitive data and can be51
easily lost or stolen. Differently from AES/DES white-box implementations, the authors do not decline52
a well-known cipher into the new framework, but they develop a new one, relying on a modification53
of Lai-Massey structure. The crucial point is that only the encryption is thought to be done on the54
IoT constrained device, while the decryption phase is supposed to be done on a computer or server55
and in a black box scenario. In [25] the authors refer to embedded distributed devices which collect56
and securely send information to centralized servers. Subsequently, these servers decrypt and process57
all the information. As previously mentioned, the collected information may be sensitive and it is58
possible for an attacker to get control of the whole device. The scheme proposed in [25] is lightweight59
and suitable for constrained devices. In particular, such a new design has the following peculiarities:60
• the employed operations are very simple; they essentially consist of lookup tables and bit61
operations;62
• the lookup tables and the structure containing sensitive data are small in memory;63
• the provided security is medium-level (∼ 263) and protection is ensured for reasonable amount of64
time;65
• it is possible to update the key at small costs.66
The scheme is based on a Fesitel structure, but it adds two bijections, as a defence against attacks.67
Moreover, to cope with structural cryptanalysis [25,26] different size components are used.68
This paper improves of a previous work entiteled “White-box Cryptography: A Time-security69
Trade-off for the SPNbox Family” [27], presented by F.Cioschi, N.Fornari and A.Visconti at the70
2nd International Conference on International Conference on Wireless, Intelligent and Distributed71
Environment for Communication (WIDECOM 2019). In this paper, we (a) introduce the white-box72
approach in the IoT context, explaining the importance of protecting data in an environment where73
attackers have full control over the whole system; (b) explain the importance of having a fast black-box74
implementation of a white-box cipher; (c) summarize our previous idea [27] explaining how to modify75
Version September 2, 2019 submitted to Symmetry 3 of 18
the internal block ciphers of the SPNbox family in order to increase the size of the key space; (d)76
measure the performance of a black-box implementation (server-side) on 32- and 64-bit architectures77
and by encrypting/decrypting 10,000 payloads of a lightweight messaging protocol — i.e., MQTT —78
which contains the data sent over the Internet.79
The remainder of the paper is organized as following. In Section 2, block ciphers are introduced.80
In Section 3, we present several white-box implementations and related attacks published in literature.81
In Section 4 an 5, we summarize two block ciphers’ families, namely, SPACE and SPNbox, which are82
white-box friendly by design. In Section 6, we explain the importance of increasing the number of bits83
of the key used in each round. In Section 7, the testing activities are presented. Finally, Section 8 is84
devoted to discussion and conclusions.85
2. Block ciphers86
There exist two main families of block ciphers: substitution-permutation network (SPN) and87
Feistel network. The main difference between them is that Feistel networks play only with one half of88
the cipher state in each round.89
2.1. Substitution-Permutation Networks90
A substitution-permutation network (SPN) is a design for block ciphers proposed by Shannon in91
[28], where he suggested to use multiple mixing layers interleaving substitutions and permutations.92
Although weak on its own, applying substitutions and then permutations presents good "mixing"93
properties. Substitutions contribute to local confusion and permutations spread such a local confusion94
to the more distant subblocks, thus providing diffusion [28]. If a single input bit is flipped, it affects the95
m output bits of a specific S-box which, subsequently, are sent to different S-boxes by a permutation.96
Considering the output of such a network, about fifty percent of the bits are affected by this change.97
Therefore an outcome of a single bit change at the input is difficult to predict, especially if the bit of the98
secret key are XORed into the block between the encryption layers. In order to get better diffusion99
properties, several block ciphers adopt linear (as in the case of AES) or affine mappings instead of100
permutations.101
Definition 1. Let φ : (F2)r × (F2)l → (F2)r, with r = bt be a block cipher with N rounds. Let k ∈ (F2)l be
the cipher key and (k(0), · · · , k(N)) be the N + 1 round keys generated by k through the key schedule.
Then φ is an SPN block cipher if
φk(x) = τN ◦ τN−1 ◦ . . . ◦ τ0(x) x ∈ (F2)r
where τi = σk(i) ◦ λ(i) ◦ γ(i) and102
• γ(i) : (F2t)b → (F2t)b is a non linear substitution103
• λ(i) ∈ AGL((F2)r) where AGL((F2)r) is the subgroup of the affine transformations of (F2)r104
• σk(i) is the addition with the round key
σk(i) : (F2)
r → (F2)r
x 7→ x⊕ k(i)
where by ⊕ we denote the bitwise addition (XOR)105
2.2. Feistel networks106
A Feistel network is a block cipher introduced by H. Feistel and D. Coppersmith in 1973 [29]107
which has the advantage of having the encryption and decryption functions almost identical, making108
the implementation easier and cheaper compared to translation based ciphers.109
Let us define the following functions before describing the encryption process.110
Version September 2, 2019 submitted to Symmetry 4 of 18
Definition 2. Let pit be a projection, with t ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}, defined as:
pit : F2n → Ft
(x1, . . . , x2n) 7→ (x1, . . . , xt)
Considering x ∈ F2n as a vector of bits, we can use projection pit to choose the t most significant bits of111
x.112
Definition 3. Let $t be a projection, with t ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}, defined as:
$t : F2n → Ft
(x1, . . . , x2n) 7→ (x2n−t+1, . . . , x2n)
In the same way, using projection $t we can choose the t least significant bits of x.113
114
Given m ∈ F2n (a message) and k ∈ Fl (a secret key), for some positive integer l, the encryption process115
works as follows:116
1. N + 1 round keys k0, ..kN are generated from k by means of the key schedule117
2. message m is split into a left block and right block, initialized as
L0 = pin(m) R0 = $n(m)
3. for i ∈ {1, . . . , N + 1} the round function is applied in the following way:
Li = Ri−1 Ri = Li−1 ⊕ F(Ri−1, ki−1) (1)
4. final ciphertext c is (RN+1, LN+1).118
Encryption and decryption only differ in the reverse order of the round keys, as a matter of fact the
decryption of ciphertext (RN+1, LN+1) is accomplished computing for i ∈ {N, N − 1, . . . , 0}
Ri = Li+1 Li = Ri+1 ⊕ F(Li+1, ki) (2)
An advantage of Feistel networks is that Feistel function F is non-necessarily invertible.This can119
be clearly seen by analyzing how encryption and decryption work (see Equations 1 and 2).120
3. The White-Box approach121
The White-Box approach aims to avoid key recovery attacks by embedding the cryptographic key122
into a robust representation of the cipher. Consider a block cipher φ. We compute a map ψ : Fn → Fn123
such that, given a key k¯ ∈ Fl , it holds φ(x, k¯) = ψ(x) ∀x ∈ Fn. If an attacker knows even both φ and ψ,124
it should be very hard for him to find out the key.125
Example 1. Let φ and ψ be defined as follows:
φ(x) := k + x mod 4 x ∈ {0, . . . , 3}
ψ(x) := S[x] S = [3, 0, 1, 2]
If k = 3, we can consider ψ as a white-box implementation of φ, by representing ψ as a lookup table.126
The first white-box AES implementation has been proposed by Chow et al. in [13]. The authors127
suggest that key extraction can be avoided by a careful use of lookup tables. In particular, given128
a secret key and a block cipher, it is possible to create a lookup table which maps the plaintext in129
a corresponding ciphertext. In some cases, this lookup table may be huge and unusable due to its130
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dimension. Therefore, a block cipher φ can be represented as a network of smaller lookup tables (see131
Figure 1) that have to be read in a particular order [13]. Unfortunately, in the white-box framework an132
adversary has full access to these tables, exposing the cipher to possible attacks. Since there is no reason133
to make an attacker’s life easier, tables can be protected by means of internal encodings [13]. This134
means that a map is composed after table i and its inverse before table (i + 1), leaving the ciphertext135
unchanged. However, internal encoding does not protect against code-lifting attacks. Indeed, an136
attacker may recover the tables of the cipher and understand their concatenation order. Doing so,137
she/he is able to decrypt messages even though he had not recovered the secret key. Therefore, another138
protection is required: external encoding. Internal and external encodings are also discussed in [30],139
while a different approach, based on polynomial algebra techniques [31], gave rise to a perturbated140
white-box implementation of AES [32], broken by [33] in 2010.141
Figure 1. Table-based white-box implementation: the key k is scrambled by a network of lookup tables
Chow’s work is a milestone for white-box cryptography and its framework has also been used by142
some subsequent works such as [34] and [35]. However, researchers found attacks also for these new143
approaches:144
• White-Box AES Implementation: Chow [13]; Attack: [16]; Work Factor: 230;145
• White-Box AES Implementation: Karroumi [34]; Attack: [18] and [20]; Work Factor: 222;146
• White-Box AES Implementation: Xiao Lai [35]; Attack: [18]; Work Factor: 232;147
• White-Box AES Implementation: Xiao Lai [35] generic linear version; Attack: [18]; Work Factor:148
238;149
• White-Box AES Implementation: Xiao Lai [35] affine/non-affine version; Attack: [19]; Work150
Factor: at least 249.151
The attacks listed above may require to know the internal data representation and sometimes this152
means to produce a significant reverse engineering effort. An improved AES implementation is given153
in [36]. This implementation is immune to attacks described in [16,18] but it is not to the one presented154
in [37].155
The first paper aiming to break all white-box implementations belonging to the framework156
introduced in [13] is [19], but it has the weak point to require some additional hypotheses. Differently,157
[38] breaks all the papers in Chow’s framework by solving the affine equivalence problem (see [39]158
and [40]). Chow’s framework has also been used by [41] and subsequently attacked by [42].159
A significant advance from the attacker’s point of view became feasible by shifting the focus160
from the attacks previously described to side channel attacks [43]. In particular, new approaches to161
verify the security of a white-box implementation have been proposed in [44] where Bos et al. present162
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differential fault analysis (DFA) and differential computational analysis (DCA) attacks1. In addition,163
[47] and [48] explained more formally why DCA is effective against linear and nibble encoding, [43]164
provides an extensive analysis on the effectiveness of DCA, and [49] gives a general protection method165
for white-box implementations against DCA.166
Obfuscation techniques or the randomization of the location of the lookup tables can be used to167
enhance security of white-box algorithms [50], while [51] examines how these techniques are successful168
against both DCA and differential power attacks (DPA). The paper [52] exploits noncommutative169
groups to obfuscate operation that should be made on commutative ones and it is employed in the IoT170
framework. Finally, an evaluation on software protections to white-box implementations is provided171
by [51] .172
Some improvements to DCA have been developed by [53] and [43]. The first one extends DCA to173
successfully address implementations using masking and shuffling techniques [53]. The second one174
provide a DCA-like collision attack with a good complexity [43].175
Some paper such as [54], [55] and [56] address the problem of incompressibility or code hardness.176
The idea is that an attacker in the white-box framework should not be able to rewrite the code of177
some implementation in order to decrease the code-hardness. In [54] two incompressible white-box178
schemes called “WhiteKey” and “WhiteBlock” are introduced and one instance for each scheme179
is provided (called PuppyCipher and CoureurDesBois respectively), [55] describes the concept of180
code-hardness, time-hardness and memory-hardness, while [56] provides a new incompressible181
white-box implementation based on the assumption of one-way permutations.182
We conclude our extensive analisys of implementations and attacks, citing a white-box signature183
scheme [57] and the methods [58] used to attack the most resistant implementation submitted to the184
white-box competition called “CHES 2017 CTF Challenge”.185
In the sequel, we will analyze in detail two family of white-box cipher called SPACE (Section 4)186
and SPNbox (Section 5).187
4. SPACE: a block cipher188
SPACE is a block cipher developed by Bogdanov and Isobe in [23], that is based on a Feistel189
network. This cipher is designed so that security against key extraction in the white-box context190
reduces to the well studied problem of key recovery for block ciphers in the standard black-box setting.191
SPACE is a generalized Feistel network [29]. Given a message192
m ∈ Fn and a secret key k ∈ K, it encrypts m to a ciphertext c ∈ Fn. In describing SPACE,193
three quantities are often employed: n, na, nb ∈ N. In particular, in [23] n = 128, na ∈ {8, 16, 24, 32}194
and nb = n− na.195
We summarize here the encryption procedure:196
1. The state Xr at round r can be seen as given by l = n/na vectors xri ∈ Fna so
Xr = {xr0, xr1, . . . , xrl−1}.
2. X0 = m, so it is initialized with the plaintext.197
3. For r ∈ {1, . . . , R + 1} the state is updated this way:
Xr+1 =
(
Frna(x
r
0)⊕ (xr1||xr2|| . . . ||xrl−1)
) ||xr0
where Frna : F
na → Fnb is the Feistel function and || is the concatenation.198
4. XR+1 = c so we have found the ciphertext.199
1 Further information on fault-injection and differential power analysis attacks can be found in [45] and [46] respectively.
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At each encryption round, the Feistel function takes xr0 as input. Then F
r
na(x
r
0) is added to the rest200
of the state (xr1|| . . . ||xrl−1). The first nb bits of the new state are given by the result of this operation.201
The last na are filled with xr0.202
Now, consider pit be the projection of Definition 2 and the Feistel function Frna used by SPACE,203
specified in Definition 4.204
Definition 4. Let φk be a block cipher and r the round number represented in binary with nb digits (so we see it
as an element of Fnb ). The Feistel function Frna is defined as
Frna(x) : F
na → Fnb
x 7→ (pinb(φk(
nb︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0 ||x)))⊕ r.
We give a specific notation for the round independent part of Fna .205
Definition 5. The round independent part of the Feistel function Fna is
F
′
na : F
na → Fnb
x 7→ pinb(φk(
nb︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0 ||x))
Notice that, differently from traditional Feistel networks, SPACE does not use round keys. There is one
secret key k used by φk. This secret key cannot be hardcoded, hence F
′
na is implemented as a look-up
table. The reader might ask himself the reason for designing SPACE over another block cipher φk when
φk could be directly implemented as a look-up table. It turns out that this second possibility cannot be
developed. If we were to implement φk as a look-up table we would need 2n · n bits of space:
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
(0, . . . 0, 0) 7→
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
φk(0, . . . 0, 0)
(0, . . . 0, 1) 7→ φk(0, . . . 0, 1)
...
(1, . . . 1, 1) 7→ φk(1, . . . 1, 1)
For n = 128 the construction of such a look-up table is practically impossible. Therefore Bogdanov206
and Isobe propose to truncate the output of φk, computed over a smaller domain:207
(
nb︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0 ||
na︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . 0, 0) 7→
nb︷ ︸︸ ︷
pinb(φk(0, . . . , 0||0, . . . 0, 0)
(0, . . . , 0||0, . . . 0, 1) 7→ pinb(φk(0, . . . , 0||0, . . . 0, 1))
...
(0, . . . , 0||1, . . . 1, 1) 7→ pinb(φk(0, . . . , 0||1, . . . 1, 1))
Figure 2. The value of each image of F
′
na (x) is saved as a row in a look-up table. Every row is indexed
by the value of x, x ∈ {0, . . . , 2na − 1}.
Since the first nb zeros are used as padding in order to form an n-bit input to provide to φk, it is208
completely useless to store them, hence the look-up table implementation needs 2na · nb bits. Thus, the209
size of the tables for different values of na ∈ {8, 16, 24, 32}— SPACE(na,R), where R is the suggested210
number of rounds — is the following:211
• SPACE-(8,300); Table: 3.84 KB212
• SPACE-(16,128); Table: 918 KB213
• SPACE-(24,128); Table: 218 MB214
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• SPACE-(32,128); Table: 51.5 GB215
Notice that (1) AES white-box implementations of Chow et al. [13] and Xiao Lai [35] has a table of 752216
KB and 20.5 MB respectively; (2) not all na values are suitable, indeed, for na = 32 and na = 24 the size217
of the table is not good enough to be used in practice. On the contrary, for na = 16 the table has the218
same size of that described in [13].219
5. The SPNbox Family220
The SPACE family of space-hard block ciphers [23] benefits of the Feistel structure from a security221
point of view and prevents the use of parallel execution (see Section 4). However, as suggested in [24],222
using an SPN-type design it is possible to satisfy the requirement of parallelism maintaining a suitably223
high level of space hardness. Thus, Bogdanov et al. described the SPNbox family of space-hard block224
ciphers [24]. Let us briefly explain their idea.225
SPNbox-nin is a substitution-permutation network (SPN) with a block length of n bits, a k-bit226
secret key, and based on nin-bit substitution boxes.227
State:228
The state of SPNbox-nin is representable as a vector of t = n/nin elements of nin bits each:
X = {X0, ..., Xt−1}
Key Schedule:229
The k-bit master key is expanded, k0, ..., kRnin round keys of nin bits, by means of a Key Derivation
Function (KDF) — e.g., PBKDF2 [59–62], ARGON2 [63], Scrypt [64], and so on:
(k0, ..., kRnin ) = KDF(k, nin · (Rnin + 1))
Round Transformation:230
We encrypt a plaintext X0 and we get a ciphertext XR, by using the following R transformations
— e.g., R = 10:
XR = (©Rr=1(σr ◦ θ ◦ γ))(X0)
The nonlinear layer γ is a substitution layer where t identical bijective nin-bit S-boxes depending on
the key are applied to the state:
γ : F(2nin)t → F(2nin)t
(X0, ..., Xt−1) 7→ (Snin(X0), ..., Snin(Xt−1))
(3)
231
These identical S-boxes are constituted by an internal small block cipher of block length nin bit.232
233
The linear layer θ, a diffusion layer, applies a t× t MDS matrix to the state:
θ : F(2nin)t → F(2nin)t
(X0, ..., Xt−1) 7→ (X0, ..., Xt−1) ·Mnin
234
235
The affine layer σr takes the state and adds round-dependent constants to it:236
σr : F(2nin)t → F(2nin)t
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(X0, ..., Xt−1) 7→ (X0 ⊕ Cr0, ..., Xt−1 ⊕ Crt−1),
with Cri = (r− 1) · t + i + 1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ t− 1.237
The Underlying Small Block Ciphers:238
The identical nin-bit S-boxes in the γ layer (which depend on the key) are block ciphers. They are
based on the round transformation of AES and they are formed by Rnin rounds operating on a state
x = {x0, ..., xl−1} of l bytes, where l = nin/8:
Snin : F(2
8)l → F(28)l
x 7→ (©Rnini=1 (AKi ◦MCnin ◦ SB))(AK0(x))
where SB, MC and AK indicate the AES transformations SubBytes, MixColumns and AddRoundKey,239
respectively. Notice that (a) the number of rounds Rnin that [24] suggests are R32=16, R24=20, R16=32240
and R8=64; (b) different matrices are employed in the MCnin round transformation. More precisely, for241
nin=32 we use the MC matrix of AES, while in the other cases a sub-matrix of MC is used. If nin=8,242
MCnin is the identity map’s matrix. Note that, as for the Feistel function in SPACE, in the white-box243
setting the small block ciphers Snin are implemented as lookup tables.244
6. Issues and possible solutions245
Although the white-box implementation of the cipher is very important, it may have some246
limitations due to the key embedded into the device. If several devices have to communicate with a247
server and such devices do not support TLS due to insufficient resources, the server needs to manage248
a number of keys (pre-shared or not) in order to decrypt the messages. In a white-box context this249
means having a number of different implementations that run on our server and this is not a good250
idea. Therefore, the server will be provided with a fast black-box implementation of the cipher.251
Figure 3 helps us to visualize this idea, where a white-box implementation runs on a number of252
devices and a fast black-box implementation runs on our server.253
Figure 3. A black-box implementation (server-side)
In order to design a fast black-box implementation of a white-box cipher, we modify the inner254
round described in Section 5, increasing the number of bits of the key used in each round. In particular,255
we replace the AES’ ShiftRow transformation, omitted by [24], with a key-dependent circular bit shift256
transformation (see Figures 4 and 5).257
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Figure 4. A BitShift key-dependent: Increasing the size of the round key from 8 to 11 bits.
If we are shifting 8 bits of the state, i.e., nin=8, 3 bits are required to execute the circular shift. Thus,258
we use 11 bits of the key in each round i: 8 of them for the AKi transformation and 3 for the BitShift259
transformation. If the state doubled, tripled, or quadrupled, i.e., nin=16, 24, 32, the bits of the key used260
are 11× 2 = 22, 11× 3 = 33 and 11× 4 = 44 respectively.261
Notice that the implementation of [24] employs the AES-NI instructions, while the idea described262
in this paper does not. In the encryption phase (nin=32, 24, 16), the matrices involved in the computation263
of the MixColumns transformation (A24, and A16 for short) are sub-matrices of that used in AES (A32).264
On the contrary, in the decryption phase, we need to invert A24 and A16. Since their inverse matrices265
are not sub-matrices of A−132 and the decryption instruction of AES-NI is based only on A
−1
32 , for266
nin=24,16 we cannot use the AES-NI instructions. Anyway, in IoT context, the impossibility of using267
AES-NI instructions is not a problem in itself because not all IoT devices support this instruction set.268
Figure 5. SPNbox: a new inner round γ
7. Testing activities269
The testing activity reported is twofold. In the first part, we measure the performance of internal270
layer γ (see Algorithm 1) — the external part (layer θ and σ) is exactly the same as in [24], so it would271
be pointless to evaluate it.272
In the second part, as explained in Section 6, we examine the cipher in the IoT context, where273
black-box and white-box implementations are involved.274
7.1. 32/64-bit architectures275
We compared the performance of internal layer γ (yellow rectangles of Figure 5) with and without276
BitShift transformation (green rectangles of Figure 5) for different nin sizes. We avoid the operations277
involved in θ and σ layers.278
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Algorithm 1: Layer γ with BitShift transformation
1 Function SPNbox(state):
2 for r = 1→ R do
3 layer_gamma(state)
4 layer_theta(state)
5 layer_sigma(state, r)
6 Function layer_gamma(state):
7 Set nin = 8, 16, or 32
8 foreach chunk of length nin in state do
9 Snin(state)
10 Function Snin(state):
11 AddRoundKey(state)
12 for i = 1→ Rnin do
13 SubBytes(state)
14 BitShift(state)
15 MixColumns(state)
16 AddRoundKey(state)
17 Function layer_theta(state):
18 return
19 Function layer_sigma(state,r):
20 return
We run our code on laptops with different hardware configurations. More precisely, our laptops279
are equipped with280
• Intel R© CoreTM i3-330M, 2.13 GHz processor with 3 MB SmartCache, 8 GB RAM and Ubuntu281
18.04.1 LTS 64-bit. The source code has been compiled with GCC 7.3.0 with -O3 optimization282
enabled (see Table 1);283
• Intel R© CoreTM i3-350M, 2.26 GHz processor with 3 MB SmartCache, 8 GB RAM and Ubuntu284
18.04.2 LTS 64-bit. The source code has been compiled with GCC 7.4.0 with -O3 optimization285
enabled (see Table 2);286
• Intel R© CoreTM i7-2860QM, 2.50/3.60 GHz processor with 8 MB SmartCache, 16 GB RAM and287
Kubuntu 18.10 64-bit. The source code has been compiled with GCC 7.3.0 with -O3 optimization288
enabled (see Table 3);289
• Intel R© CoreTM i7-5500U, 2.40/3.00 GHz processor with 4 MB Cache, 8 GB RAM and Ubuntu290
18.04.2 LTS 64-bit. The source code has been compiled with GCC 7.4.0 with -O3 optimization291
enabled (see Table 4);292
• Intel R© CoreTM i7-8550U CPU, 1.80/4.00 GHz processor with 8 MB SmartCache, 32 GB RAM293
and Ubuntu 18.04.2 LTS 64-bit. The source code has been compiled with GCC 7.4.0 with -O3294
optimization enabled (see Table 5);295
• Intel R© CoreTM i3-350M, 2.26 GHz processor with 3 MB SmartCache, 4 GB RAM and Debian296
GNU/Linux 9 32-bit. The source code has been compiled with GCC 6.3.0 with -O3 optimization297
enabled (see Table 6);298
Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 show the time required to encrypt/decrypt one million of different plaintexts (fixed299
size of 128 bits) using the same key (randomly chosen). Notice that in addition to the key bits needed300
for the initial AddRoundKey AK0, SPNbox layer γ uses 512 key bits — i.e. 512 bit = 16 round × 32 bit301
(nin=32), or 512 bit = 32 round × 16 bit (nin=16), or 512 bit = 64 round × 8 bit (nin=8). Therefore, we302
set to 512 the minimum amount of key bits to be used in our solution. In particular, we will execute:303
12 rounds (Rnin =12), using 528 key bits (nin=32); 24 rounds (Rnin =24), using 528 key bits (nin=16); and304
finally 47 rounds (Rnin =47), using 517 key bits (nin=8).305
Version September 2, 2019 submitted to Symmetry 12 of 18
Table 1. results of tests on i3-330M with Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS 64-bit.
γ γ with BitShift
nin=32, encryption 1.178316 s 0.955048 s
nin=32, decryption 1.447580 s 1.168507 s
nin=16, encryption 3.946748 s 3.222751 s
nin=16, decryption 4.193261 s 3.308678 s
nin=8, encryption 2.547156 s 2.192452 s
nin=8, decryption 2.564750 s 2.250102 s
Table 2. results of tests on i3-350M with Ubuntu 18.04.2 LTS 64-bit.
γ γ with BitShift
nin=32, encryption 1.116117 s 0.902140 s
nin=32, decryption 1.367435 s 1.150235 s
nin=16, encryption 3.717744 s 3.035942 s
nin=16, decryption 3.954781 s 3.116000 s
nin=8, encryption 2.395998 s 2.061877 s
nin=8, decryption 2.405397 s 2.114405 s
Table 3. results of tests on i7-2860QM with Kubuntu 18.10 64-bit.
γ γ with BitShift
nin=32, encryption 0.837671 s 0.668838 s
nin=32, decryption 0.925293 s 0.816856 s
nin=16, encryption 2.667934 s 2.147471 s
nin=16, decryption 2.811657 s 2.394600 s
nin=8, encryption 1.886357 s 1.565764 s
nin=8, decryption 2.030491 s 1.777118 s
Table 4. results of tests on i7-5500U with Ubuntu 18.04.2 LTS 64-bit.
γ γ with BitShift
nin=32, encryption 0.861415 s 0.701899 s
nin=32, decryption 0.954985 s 0.782088 s
nin=16, encryption 2.980274 s 2.461575 s
nin=16, decryption 3.155612 s 2.543056 s
nin=8, encryption 1.860916 s 1.774127 s
nin=8, decryption 1.879749 s 1.785562 s
Table 5. results of tests on i7-8550U with Ubuntu 18.04.2 LTS 64-bit.
γ γ with BitShift
nin=32, encryption 0.681576 s 0.526522 s
nin=32, decryption 0.723118 s 0.587942 s
nin=16, encryption 2.396308 s 1.898987 s
nin=16, decryption 2.462049 s 1.933232 s
nin=8, encryption 1.160104 s 1.258072 s
nin=8, decryption 1.179036 s 1.248327 s
Table 6. results of tests on i3-350M with Debian GNU/Linux 9 32-bit.
γ γ with BitShift
nin=32, encryption 1.247818 s 1.041543 s
nin=32, decryption 1.967226 s 1.558086 s
nin=16, encryption 3.721377 s 3.381363 s
nin=16, decryption 4.164744 s 3.262065 s
nin=8, encryption 2.399780 s 2.065451 s
nin=8, decryption 2.412146 s 2.127425 s
Our testing activities show that implementations with BitShift are generally faster than those306
without it. In particular, several cases show that the improvement in the execution time exceeds 20%.307
Only in Table 5, nin=8, encryption and decryption, we find a different result.308
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Algorithm 2: MQTT: testing activity executed for each payload (16, 64, 128, and 1024 bytes)
1 Function layer_gamma_without_Bitshift(state, nin, key):
2 foreach chunk of length nin in state do
3 AddRoundKey(state, key)
4 for i = 1→ Rnin do
5 SubBytes(state)
6 MixColumns(state)
7 AddRoundKey(state, key)
8 Function layer_gamma_with_Bitshift(state, nin, key):
9 foreach chunk of length nin in state do
10 AddRoundKey(state, key)
11 for i = 1→ Rnin do
12 SubBytes(state)
13 BitShift(state)
14 MixColumns(state)
15 AddRoundKey(state, key)
16 Function main():
17 Open a connection
18 Set key k = Random()
19 Set plaintext p = Random()
20 foreach nin in (8, 16, 32) do
21 Set timer t1 = 0
22 Set p1 = p
23 for i = 1→ 100 do
24 for j = 1→ 10, 000 do
25 layer_gamma_without_BitShift(p1, nin, k)
26 Send p1 as payload with a MQTT message
27 Stop timer t1
28 Set timer t2 = 0
29 Set p2 = p
30 for i = 1→ 100 do
31 for j = 1→ 10, 000 do
32 layer_gamma_with_BitShift(p2, nin, k)
33 Send p2 as payload with a MQTT message
34 Stop timer t2
35 Compare t1 and t2
36 Close the connection
7.2. IoT environment309
The testing activity has been performed using MQTT [65], a lightweight communication protocol310
designed for small sensors and mobile devices in low bandwidth environments. By default data are311
sent in clear text over the Internet, thus we encrypt data contained in the payload. We measure the312
performance of layer γ as described in Algorithm 2. More precisely, we compare the performances313
with and without BitShift transformation for different nin — size of 32, 16, and 8 bits — encrypting314
one million of different plaintexts — size of 16, 64, 256, and 1024 bytes — using the same key. Then,315
we send one hundred MQTT messages, each of which contains 10,000 encrypted payloads. Finally,316
adopting the same approach, the server collects and decrypts the same number of MQTT messages317
with encrypted payloads.318
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Table 7. Encryption/decryption operations with a black-box implementation (server-side)
Payload nin Encryption Decryption
(Bytes) (Bits) w/o BitShift with BitShift Gain w/o BitShift with BitShift Gain
32 3.668s 3.319s 9.507% 0.893s 0.741s 16.999%
16 16 6.335s 5.763s 9.037% 3.096s 2.412s 22.091%
8 4.510s 4.882s -8.254% 1.479s 1.551s -4.929%
32 6.679s 5.601s 16.139% 3.636s 2.950s 18.865%
64 16 14.869s 12.362s 16.860% 12.488s 10.023s 19.739%
8 8.817s 9.616s -9.060% 6.183s 6.446s -4.253%
32 16.021s 13.847s 13.569% 14.166s 11.827s 16.512%
128 16 51.098s 38.998s 23.680% 50.632s 39.596s 21.798%
8 24.280s 25.709s -5.884% 24.454s 25.825s -5.607%
32 54.047s 41.716s 22.816% 56.494s 47.065s 16.690%
1024 16 191.262s 151.101s 20.998% 195.424s 154.029s 21.182%
8 92.651s 98.998s -6.850% 93.744s 98.362s -4.926%
Our testing activity has been executed on a machine equipped with an Intel R© CoreTM i7-6500U319
CPU @ 2.50GHz x 4 processor, with 12 GB SDRAM DDR4-2133, Intel R© HD Graphics 520 (Skylake320
GT2) GPU and operating system Ubuntu 18.04.2 TLS. We used Mosquitto [66] version 1.4.15, which321
implements the MQTT protocol versions 3.1.1. The source code has been compiled with GCC 7.4.0,322
-O3 optimization enabled. Table 7 summarizes the results obtained.323
In particular, for the encryption phase, we got a highest gain (23.680%) in the case of 128-byte324
payload and nin = 16, while the highest loss (−9.060%) in the case of a 64-byte payload and nin = 8.325
For the decrypt phase, the highest gain (22.091%) is obtained with a 16-byte payload and nin = 16, and326
the highest loss (−5.607%) with a 128-byte payload and nin = 8. Notice that the case nin = 8 turned327
out to be the worst one.328
8. Conclusions329
In the era of Internet of Things the involved devices are usually lightweight, so they cannot330
perform heavy computations nor store a huge amount of data. In addition, these data might be331
sensitive — energy consumptions, medical records, and so on — and could be sent in an unprotected332
environment. In a white-box scenario, an attacker could easily read these data because she/he has full333
access to the whole execution platform and white-box cryptography can be used to secure data in this334
specific context.335
Considering the effectiveness of side-channel attacks, new ciphers has been designed with336
white-box attack model in mind. In this paper, we focused on the SPNbox family [24], suggesting337
how to increase the number of key bits used in each round and showing that this improvement affects338
the performance of the cipher. The introduction of a key-dependent circular bit shift transformation339
helped us to increase the keyspace and to reduce the number of rounds of the cipher, reducing the340
execution time too.341
We described and analyzed the performance of the modified cipher in the IoT context, where both342
white-box and black-box implementations may be required. In particular, we measured its performance343
(a) on 32/64-bit architectures and (b) encrypting the payload of an IoT messaging protocol. Our testing344
activities have been executed on consumer laptops. The results obtained encrypting and decrypting345
one million of different 128-bit plaintexts on 32/64-bit architectures showed that the execution time for346
layer γ is reduced up to 22% while the highest loss is about 8%.347
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Moreover, the testing activities performed with lightweight protocol MQTT got a gain of about348
23% and 22% (encryption and decryption phase, respectively) while a loss of about 9% and 5%. In all349
our testing activities the case nin = 8 turns out to be the worst one.350
Possible future works are try to (a) understand in details why current implementation fails for351
nin = 8 and (b) implement a communication protocol based on TLS-PSK, in order to compare the352
performance of white-box implementations with those of lightweight ciphers.353
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